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obtaining a divorce, wherever granted, is void if a party resides and
2
intends to continue to reside in this state. '

ROBERT

H.

BICHLER

Admiralty: Apportionment of Damages According to FaultLibelant's steamship, the Torondoc, while navigating the Chicago River,
collided with a bridge owned and operated by the City of Chicago.
The Federal District Court found that the acts of both parties were
proximate causes of the collision and apportioned one-third of the
negligence and damages to the City of Chicago and two-thirds to the
libelant. The facts constituting libelant's fault include: (1) inability
of the ship to stop because of excessive speed and (2) libelant's
employment of a ship's master who was inexperienced in maneuvering
a large vessel down a river spanned by a number of independent
bridges closely spaced. The facts constituting fault on the part of the
City of Chicago include (1) negligent maintenance of the electrical
control system of the bridge (span failed to open properly) (2) the
bridgetender's failure to show a red lantern when the span would not
operate. N. M. Patterson & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago.'
After judgment both parties appeared and moved for amendment
of the damages on grounds that the court was bound by a settled rule
of maritime law to divide damages equally in the case of a collision
arising from mutual fault. Overruling the motion, the court summed
up its reasons saying:
In view of the fact that our Supreme Court has never
ordered equal division of damages in any case where the findings
were specific that the respective degrees of contributing fault
were unequal, this court is free in this case to apportion damages
unequally, based upon the specific unequal degrees of contributing fault of which it has found each party to have been guilty.
It has always been the policy of the Supreme Court that a court
of admiralty has the discretion, flexibility and duty to do the
complete
justice inherent in the historical role of the maritime
2
court.

The court attempted to distinguish the original United States Supreme
Court decision on the subject of apporfionment of damages, The
Catherine,3 on the grounds that that case did not purport to govern
collisions occuring under other than "usual" circumstances. Thus, in
The Catherine, the United States Supreme Court said:
The question we believe has never until now come distinctly before this court for decision. The rule that prevails in
the district and circuit courts, we understand, has been to divide
§245.04 (1) (1961).
209 F. Supp. 576 (N.D.Ill., E.D. 1962).
2Id. at 591.
3 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854).
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This seems now to be the well-settled rule in the
the loss ....
English Admiralty. . . . Under the circumstances usually at-

tending these disasters, we think the rule dividing the loss the
to induce care and
most just and equitable and as best tending
4
vigilance on both sides, in the navigation.
With respect to this language the court in the Patterson case said:
Indeed the quoted language seems to give express license
to apply some other principle of division where the circumstances are other than those "usually" attending such disasters.
In the context of the opinion, one could hardly conceive circumstances other than "usual" to be anything but a case where
disparity exists in the degrees of fault and the court is able to
determine such respective degrees.5
In a later case, The Atlas,6 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule
and cited three English decisions 7 which allegedly traced the development of the rule. The Federal District Court disagrees with the
Supreme Court interpretation of these cases, claiming that the court
obtained an all encompassing rule from cases which are much more
restricted in their decisions.
Thus, in the Patterson case, the Federal District Court seeks to
overrule a well settled principle of maritime law, namely that
. . . [W]here there is concurring negligence, the general
rule in admiralty is that the damages shall be equally divided.
In other words, that each party at fault must bear one half of
the loss."
Historically this rule has had an irregular growth. It first appeared
in the Laws of Oleron, a code of maritime law attributed to the
twelfth century. At first the rule was applied only to accidental collisions or those to which the masters swore that they did not do the
damage "wittingly." In the English Admiralty there is no record earlier
than the seventeenth century of loss by collision having been divided.9
4 Supra note 3, at 177.
5 Supra note 1, at 584.
[I]n a case where there is
693 U.S. 302, 319 (1876) The rule is stated "...
mutual fault . .. the rule is that the combined amount of the loss shall be
equally apportioned between the offending vessels."
7 Hay v. La Neve, 2 Shaw H. of L. 395 (1824) is distinguished in that it applies to a situation where the respective degrees of negligence could not be
or were difficult of determination. Vaux v. Sheffer, 8 Moore P.C.C. 87, 14
Eng. Rep. 30 (1852) and the Lindea 4 Jur. N.S. 147, 166 Eng. Rep. 1149
(1857) are distinguished on the grounds that although they hold for equal
division of damages, they do not prohibit a different result where unequal
degrees of fault could be ascertained.
8
Annot. 25 A.L.R. 1556 (1923). See also 24 R.C.L. 1242 (1919) and 2 Ai. JuL,
2d Admiralty §187 (1962).
94 BRInSH SI41PPING LAWS 102 (11th ed. 1961). This is a revision of MARSlEN,
COLLISIONS AT SEA. See also 11 SELDEN SociEry LXXXIII (1897) and Huger,
The ProportionalDamage Rule in Collisions at Sea, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 531
(1927).
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The first case which recognizes that damages may be divided is apparently unreported. Below is Marsden's account.
On May 20, 1789, Sir James Marriot, Judge of the Admiralty Court, in The Petersfield and The Judith Randolph,
pronounced "that both ships were in fault; that the Judith
Randolph was most in fault; and decreed that the whole of the
damage sustained by the owners of the ship Petersfield and her
cargo, which was sunk and lost, as well as the £230 damages
and expenses given against the ship Petersfield, and the costs
of the suit here on both sides, be borne equally by the parties
in this suit."
This appears to have been the first case in which the rusticum
judicium ° was applied solely upon the ground that both ships
were in fault, with an express finding that the fault of one
ship was greater than the fault of the other."'
Between 1789 and 1824, when the House of Lords handed down
Hal v. La Neve, 2 Sir Walter Scott pronounced his famous dicta in
The Woodrop-Sims 3 categorizing the various types of maritime collisions. His second class, is that where both parties are to blame and
he states "in such a case, the rule of law is that the loss must be
apportioned between them, as having been occasioned by the fault of both
of them.' 1 4 When the House of Lords modified the judgment in Hay v.
La Neve from one third - two thirds to one half - one half they

approved this dicta and its constant use and citation has given it the
force of decision.' 5 Most treatises cite The Woodrop-Sims or Hay v.

La Neve as the source of the equally divided damages rule. This writer
was unable to find any authors who disagreed with the divided damages
rule in that it existed and was grounded on the three cases just discussed. Although it might be possible to distinguish one or more of
these foundation cases, the overwhelming weight of authority recognizes them as the source of the rule.
The United States is the only large maritime nation which has not
ratified the Brussels Collision Convention of 1910.16 By the terms of
this Convention, damages for mutual fault maritime collisions would
be apportioned proportional to the fault of the respective parties.
President Truman, in 1948, withdrew this treaty from consideration
after it had been repeatedly deferred and postponed for two World
Wars and a hoped for unification with other maritime treaties. 17 In
103 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 231

(1844). The term is sometimes defined as a

rough and ready justice.
11 Supra note 9, at 102.
12 Supra note 7.
132 Dods. 83, 165 Eng. Rep. 1422 (1815).

24Ibid.
15 Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17
343 (1932).

CORNELL L.Q.

'164 BENFDICT, THE LAw OF AMERIcAN ADMIRALTY 262 (6th ed. 1940).
"7ANONYMIOUS, THE DIFFIcULT QUEST FOR A UNIFORM MARITIME LAW;

333,

Corn-
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1929 the American Bar Association had disapproved of ratification
of the treaty'8 and this disapproval, together with objections of cargo
owners who would lose a degree of remedy for damages if cargo were
lost in a mutual fault collision, helped prevent ratification. Another
cry often raised against ratification concerned Article Six of the treaty
which, opponents alleged, would destroy a number of presumptions
established in American case law and cause confusion in the American
admiralty practice. 9 This argument is refuted by Benedict who claims
that the Convention French was inaccurately translated and only meant
20
the abolition of statutory presumptions.
Recently, legislation has been again introduced in the United States
to rectify the obvious inequities of the mutual fault damages rule.
Bills based on the Brussel's Limitation Convention of 1957
and the Brussel's Collision Convention were introduced in both
houses of Congress during 1961 ....

The collision bills would

substitute the proportionate fault rule for the present equal
division of damages rule applicable in "both-to-blame" collisions,
and would limit cargo recovery in accordance with the degree
of fault on the part of the non-carrying vessel. Both bills have
the approval of the American Merchant Marine Institute
and
21
the Maritime Law Association of the United States.
The House of Representatives bill, H.R.7911, had received specific
American Bar Association approval 22 but apparently received no
further congressional consideration after its initial introduction.23 Senate bill, S.2313, was indefinitely postponed on September 28, 1962 on
grounds that discussion would be prolonged and agreement that the
24
bill could be reintroduced at an early date.
As S.555 and H.R.1070 both bills have been reintroduced in the
88th Congress.

25

If these bills do not become law, it may still be possible for the
Supreme Court to change the rule judicially.
Actually there is no reason why the Supreme Court cannot
at this late date "confess error" and adopt the proportional
fault rule without Congressional action. The resolution to follow
the divided damages rule, taken one hundred years ago rested
not on overwhelming authority but on judgment of fact and of
fairness which may have been tenable then, but are hardly so
ment, Failure of the Brussells Conventions to Achieve International Agreement on Collision Liability, Liens, and Mortgages, 64 YALE L.J. 878, 890
(1955).
18 54 A.B.A. REP. 278, 281 (1929).
19 Supra note 17, at 887.
20 Supra note 16, at 263.
211961 ANN. SURVEY Am. L. 551.
2248 A.B.A.J. 366 (April, 1962).
23 107 CONG. REc. 10725 (daily ed. June 28, 1961).
24 108 CoN- REc. 20085 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1962).
25 109 CONG. REc. 119 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1963) House Bill 109 CoNG. Rac. 1116
(daily ed. Jan. 28, 1963) Senate Bill.
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today. No "vested rights" in theory or in fact have intervened.
The regard for "settled expectation" which is the heart-reason
of that modified form of stare decisis prevailing in the United
States can have no relevance in respect to such a rule; the concept of "settled expectation" would be reduced to an absurdity
were it to be applied to a rule of damages for negligent collision.
The abrogation of the rule would not, it seems, produce a disharmony 20with other branches of maritime law, general or
statutory.
The only way to approach the Supreme Court and endeavor to have
the rule judicially changed is to have an actual case begin in the district courts and be affirmed by one of the circuit courts of appeal.
This is the manner in which the admiralty personal injury law developed. Once the circuits are in conflict the Supreme Court will review the
question.2 7 However obtaining a circuit court affirmance of the district court may pose some difficulties. The second and third circuits
have definitely stated that they cannot change the divided damages
rule.28 The sixth circuit approved of a case which they recognized as
unjust.
We are of the opinion that the fault of the Wood was far
more serious than fault on the part of the International, and as
pointed out in Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, supra, it

is a case where the Continental rule
of comparative negligence
2 9
would produce a more just result.

Although many cases decided in England after adoption of the
Convention proportional damages rule have had damages divided
equally, 0 there seems to be little doubt that the divided damages rule
wreaks an injustice. In 1896 one writer called it a historical mistake. 31
Solutions presented have almost always been some proportionate damages rule although return to the contributory negligence rule( contributory negligence bars recovery) has been advocated.3 2 A number
2

6GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §§7-20 (1957).
27 Staring, Contribution and Division of Damages in Admiralty and Maritime

Cases, 45

CALIF.

L. REV. 304, 347 (1957).

28 Oriental Trading & Transport Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 173 F. 2d 108, 111 (2nd

Cir. 1949). Tank Barge Hygrade v. The Gatco New Jersey, 250 F. 2d 485,
488 (3rd Cir. 1957).
29 Eastern S. S. Co. v. International Harvester Co. of New Jersey, 189 F. 2d
472, 476 (6th Cir. 1951). The Luckenbach case may be found at 157 F.2d 250
(2d Cir. 1946).
30 Telsey, English Apportionment of Blame in Collisions at Sea, 15 TuL. L. REV.
567 (1941).
31 Franck, Collisions at Sea in Relation to InternationalMaritime Law, 12 L. Q.
REV. 260 (1896). See also Scott, Collisions at Sea 4'here Both Ships Are in
Fault, 13 L. Q. REV. 17 (1897).
32 Rheinfrank, A New Demonstrator to Determine Liability in Admiralty Cases,
And a Proposed Rule of Damages to Govern Admiralty Cases, 11 FED. B. J.
93, 100 (1950). In support of this position the author writes, "In the debates
in the English House of Lords in 1911 [before adoption of a proportional
damages rule] we find that Lord Gorell is quoted as declaring that: 'The proportional rule endeavors to establish a form of liability that was practically
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of doctrines have been developed to mitigate the harshness of the
mutual fault rule.3 3 Most of these place the collision outside of the
scope of the rule while others obviate the rule by allowing the court
to overlook small amounts of negligence when there is a great disparity between the negligences of the two parties. 3 4 Such mitigating
doctrines do not attack the real problem however, and it would be
preferable to have this country adopt a proportional damage rule.
Since establishing such a rule judiciary will be difficult, not because
reversal by the Supreme Court will cause undue hardship but rather
because of the reticence of the circuits to affirm a district court judgment that is contrary to the general rule. Attempts to jusify such a
decision must be strained if they allege to follow the development of
the original English rule. Pending legislation appears to be the best
route to a just and equitable proportional damages rule.
STEPHEN

F. SCHREITER

Gambling: The Element of Chance-In the case of United States
v. Bergland,' the defendants were charged with a violation of title
18 U.S.C. §§ 1084 and 1952,2 in that; one of the defendants would
transmit by radio, from within the Oaklawn Park Race Track at
Hot Springs, Arkansas, the results of a particular race to a codefendant, stationed outside of the track; these results would then be
impossible to apply with any degree of accuracy, and that the older Judges
in the Admiralty Division or the Admiralty Court held that no human being
could say how much blame was to be attached to each of the vessels involved
in a collision.'"
33 Supra note 16, at 268.
34 Note 20, TUL. L. REv. 585, 586 (1946).
' United States v. Bergland, 209 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
2 18 U.S.C.A. §1084 (1962) Transmission of Wagering Information; Penalties
(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate
or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing
of bets or wagers on any working event or contest, or for the transmission
of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or
credit as a result of bets or wagers, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
§1952 Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises.
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility
in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity or
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment or carrying on, of any unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified
in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section "unlawful activity" means (1) any business
enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal excise tax has not
been paid, narcotics, or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the
state in which they are committed or of the United States, or (2) extortion
or bickery in violation of the law of the state in which committed or of the
United States.

